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THE SOCIAL ROOTS 
OF GUATEMALAN 
RESISTANCE 
SHEL TON H. DA VIS 
"No one has ever been able to organize the Indians, 
but if anyone should, God save us." 
-Guatemalan Businessman (1980) 
"The presence of the Indian people in the revolution-
ary popular war-in all its forms of struggle-is a politi-
cal and military fact that the present government can no 
longer deny or contain. It is critical to understand this 
particularity of the Guatemalan revolutionary transfor-
mation which the country is undergoing." 
- Guerrilla Army of the Poor (1981) 
Located in hundreds of small communities scattered 
throughout the majestic Western Highlands and speak-
ing 22 different languages, Guatemalan Indians are 
increasingly assuming positions of leadership in the 
guerrilla movement, and experiencing the brunt of the 
Lucas government's program of violence, terror, and 
repression. 
Although periodic Indian revolts occurred through-
out the Colonial and independence periods, the roots of 
the current Indian resistance must be traced to the land 
and labor legislation that accompanied the Guatemalan 
Reform period in 1871. Beginning in that year and con-
tinuing until the fall of the regime of Jorge Ubico in 
1944, the entire apparatus of the Guatemalan state-its 
legislative machinery, its police powers, and its depart-
mental and municipal organization-was geared to 
mobilizing Indian labor for the demands of the growing 
coffee economy of the Guatemalan Pacific coast. 
Between 1871 and I 944, a vast body of agrarian legis-
lation was passed to satisfy the labor needs of the new 
class of coffee planters. At the same time, the Guate-
malan government instituted a number of laws to expro-
priate Indian communal lands. In 1884 alone, over 
100,000 acres of Indian municipal lands passed into pri-
vate hands. During this period, ladinos or non-Indians 
conlinued on page 2 
LET'S FAKE A DEAL 
A History of Arms 
Control 
MARCY DARNOVSKY 
At long last the public's passions have been aroused 
and aimed at the horrors of nuclear war. But an aroused 
populace is not necessarily a discerning one, and 
groundswells driven by fear and moral fervor can quick-
ly ebb away or be sidetracked by image manipulation 
from on high . 
The growing ranks of disarmers have already forced 
Reagan to temper his overconfident bellicosity and to 
advance "bold new" arms control proposals. While he 
is still drawing deeply from the bag of tricks filled with 
missile gaps, windows of vulnerability, and the-
Russians-are-coming, the president has opened a second 
sack of shared goals and promises of negotiations for 
arms reductions. 
The majority of disarmers will see through the crude 
sleight-of-hand that Reagan is proposing: to proceed 
with a vast military buildup while talk about reductions 
soothes the public. Administration officials have said as 
much. On May 8, they described Reagan's proposals as 
"an effort to turn public attention away from the anti-
nuclear movements in the United States and Western 
Europe." 
Other politicians have come up with "arms control" 
schemes only fractionally less obscene than Reagan's. 
Ted Kennedy, for example, supports a nuclear freeze-
in exchange for increases in conventional arms and 
armies. There will be many more proposals. 
The coming arms control extravaganza represents 
nothing new. Between World War II and 1980, officials 
of the US and the Soviet Union met more than six thou-
sand times to discuss arms control. Yet the superpowers 
have not been able to agree on eliminating a single exist-
ing weapon. The nuclear buildup has survived a test ban 
treaty, an ABM treaty, a SALT I and a SALT II. It has 
weathered storms of public protest almost as easily as it 
conlinued on page 4 
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titled large areas of the Departments of El Quiche, 
Huehuetenango, Solala, Chimaltenango, Quezaltenan-
go, San Marcos, Alta Verapaz and Baja Verapaz. They 
also migrated in large numbers into the Indian 
highlands, assuming control over local municipal 
governments and serving as hiring agents for the coastal 
coffee plantations. 
The land and labor legislation of the Guatemalan 
Reform period explains the present pattern of agrarian 
poverty and underdevelopment that exists in the high-
land region. According to the Guatemalan Agrarian 
Census of 1964, nearly 88 percent of the farm units in 
Guatemala-microfincas and sub-familiar farms-are 
too small for subsistence and occupy only 20 percent of 
the country's land area. On the other hand, a mere 2 
percent of the farm units-essentially large coffee, cot-
ton, sugar cane, and banana plantations-control near-
ly 60 percent of the land area. 
Even more revealing is the ethnic distribution of land 
ownership in Guatemala. The highland region of the 
country is characterized by the classic munifundia pat-
tern of peasant agriculture with its low productivity, 
lack of access to credit, and severe soil erosion. Over 90 
percent of the farm units enumerated as belonging to 
Indians in 1964 were insufficient in size to support an 
Indian family for a year. Moreover, within the highland 
region itself, there is a clear pattern of class stratifica-
tion along ethnic lines. According to the 1950 Agrarian 
Census, in all nine highland Indian departments-with 
the possible exception of Totonicapan-the average size 
of ladino farms was significantly larger than that of 
Indians. 
On almost every social indicator, Guatemalan Indians 
are among the poore_st population &_roups in Latin 
America. Per-capita income in the Guatemalan high-
lands is estimated to be below $200 per year. Illiteracy 
rates r.each 80 percent in the countryside. Eighty-one out 
of every 1,000 babies born in Guatemala die in their first 
year of life. Population in the nine highland Indian 
departments has grown at an average rate of 2.5 percent 
per year. 
Faced with these conditions, Indians have been forced 
to _supplement their meager farm incomes by seasonally 
migrating as farm laborers to the large coffee, cotton, 
and sugar cane plantations of the Guatemalan Pacific 
coast. In the late 1960's, this seasona_l farm_labor stream 
numbered more than 600,000 people. The average daily 
wage for farmworkers at this time was 80 cents and liv-
ing conditions, according to an international Labor 
Organization study, "were totally unacceptable with 
regard to hygiene, health, education, and morality." 
During the regimes of Presidents Juan Jose Arevalo 
(1945 through 1950) and Jacobo Arbenz ( 1951 through 
1954), the Guatemalan government attempted to allevi-
ate some of these conditions. The revolutionary govern-
ments of Arevalo and Arbenz recognized the historic 
conditions of economic exploitation and cultural dis-
crimination faced by Indians, and they tried to redirect 
government programs toward the country's massive 
peasantry. The specific needs of Indians, for example, 
were addressed in the Guatemalan Constitution of 1945, 
the law of Forced Rentals of 1947, and the Agrarian 
Reform Law (Decree Number 900) of 1952. Anthropo-
logical studies indicate that a widespread "sociological 
awakening" took place in Indian communities during 
the revolutionary period. For the first time, the govern-
ment promoted the establishment of schools, clinics, 
technical assistance programs, political parties, and 
local agrarian committees in the Indian highlands. 
Following the Castillo Armas takeover (a well-recog-
nized CIA-run invasion) in 1954, the Roman Catholic 
Church began to have a greater influence in Indian com-
munities . With the support of the government and a 
conservative Archbishop, foreign missionaries were 
given permission to set up schools, clinics, and parishes 
in Indian areas. Initially, these missionaries were "anti-
communist" in their political philosophy and motivated 
by a desire to wipe out the traditional religious broth-
er-hoods or cofradias of the Indians. After the second 
Vatican Council in 1962 and the Latin American 
Bishops' Conference in 1968, a more socially reformist 
orientation began to characterize Roman Catholic mis-
sionary work. 
The Roman Catholic Church played an extremely 
important role in the development of the cooperative 
movement in Guatemala. Although some attempts at 
cooperative formation had taken place during the 
Arevalo regime, these came to a halt after the Arbenz 
agarian reform law was passed in 1952. In the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, however, the Church began to promote 
cooperatives in rural areas. By 1967., there were 145 
agricultural, consumer, and credit cooperatives actively 
functioning in the country with a membership of over 
27,000 people. 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development provided several 
million dollars for the further development of the coop-
erative movement. By March 1976, there were 510 coop-
eratives in Guatemala, organized into eight large federa-
tions, and with a combined membership of more than 
132,000 people. Fifty-seven percent of these cooper-
atives were located in the Indian highlands where, 
according to reports written at the time, they were hav-
ing a major impact on Indian political attitudes, 
marketing strategies, and agricultural techniques. 
In 1974, President Kjell Laugerud took the unprece-
dented step of providing official support for the cooper-
ative movement. Jose Migel .Gaitan, an outspoken sup-
porter of the cooperative movement, was named deputy 
manager of BANDESA-the national agricultural cred-
it bank-and the government promised several million 
dollars for cooperative development. A number of 
cooperative leaders were also invited to the presidential 
palace to discuss the role of the cooperative movement 
in the government's new five-year development plan. 
The motives behind the government's new policy 
toward the cooperatives became clear following the 
tragic earthquake that shook Guatemala in February 
1976. The Guatemalan earthquake, as many observers 
have noted, was as much a "class phenomenon" as it 
was a ''natural disaster.'' Most of the damage took 
place in slum areas of Guatemala City and in the 
Department of Chimaltenango, where the cooperative 
movement had its greatest strength. In the aftermath of 
the earthquake, the government proved entirely incapa-
ble of directing the national reconstruction effort. 
Hence, cooperative members sought independent aid 
from international relief agencies and began the process 
of local reconstruction themselves. 
Just one month after the earthquake, the government 
also began military operations in the Department of El 
Quiche. At the same time, a full-scale military effort 
was launched along the Northern Frontier Strip, where 
a number of international petroleum companies had 
been given exploration permits .and where, for several 
years, the government had promised peasant colonists 
titles to land. 
The scope of this militarization of Indian areas came 
to world attention in May 1978 when members of a 
special forces unit of the Guatemalan army killed over 
100 Kekchi' Indian peasants in the town of Panzos, Alta 
Verapaz. Many people hoped that the international 
attention that focused on the Panzos massacre would 
bring an end to government terrorism and violence. The 
Panzos massacre, however, was only the beginning of a 
more systematic campaign of terror against the Indian 
peoples of the country. 
Throughout 1978 and 1979, the military occupied sev-
eral towns in El Quiche, kidnapping catechists and co-
operative members under the premise that they were 
assisting guerrilla forces in the area. In January 1980, a 
group of Quiche peasants went to Guatemala City to 
protest the military occupation of their communities. 
The peasants were particularly outraged by the dis-
appearance of seven catechists from Uspantan who the 
army had kidnapped, executed, and then buried in a 
common grave near Chajul. After taking their case to 
the Guatemalan Congress and several radio stations, the 
Indians went to the Spanish Embassy to seek the assis-
tance of the ambassador in obtaining an investigation of 
the deaths. The Guatemalan government responded to 
the peasants by surrounding the embassy with police 
and then burning it down. Thirty-nine people were 
killed in this incident, including 30 peasants from 
Quiche, seven embassy staff members and two Guate-
malan politicians. 
After the Spanish Embassy massacre, it became clear 
that only a well-organized and clandestine movement 
would be able to counter the violence of the govern-
ment. In 1978, a new organization called the Committee 
for Peasant Unity (CUC) was formed to defend the 
rights of farmworkers in Guatemala. CUC is the first 
labor organization in the history of Guatemala to link 
highland Indian peasants with poor Ladino workers. 
While the organization had been forced to function in 
secrecy and has seen many of its leaders killed, it has the 
support of thousands of seasonal and permanent farm-
workers. 
In February 1980, CUC called a strike of 70,000 cane 
cutters and 40,000 cotton workers, forcing the govern-
ment to raise the legal minimum wage of farmworkers 
from $1.12 to $3.20 per day. The following September, 
another CUC strike of 10,000 coffee pickers almost led 
to the abandonment of the coffee harvest on fifteen 
plantations in the municipality of Colomba. The coffee 
strike was particularly important, because it occurred in 
an economic sector that employs more workers, pro-
vides more tax revenues, and accounts for a greater pro-
portion of export earnings than any other part of the 
Guatemalan economy. 
Currently, two guerrilla organizations-the Guerrilla 
continued on page 7 
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Fake a Deal----------------
has bloomed in the more common climate of apathy. 
Instead of reversing the arms race, the six thousand 
meetings have institutionalized it. 
In the course of all this talk, there have been only a 
few fleeting episodes in which the superpowers came 
close to even partially diverting the arms race. These 
moments of opportunity were found and lost in each 
side's shifting perceptions of its military and political 
advantage. And each side has kept at least one eye 
focused on its image as a seeker of peace, a focus that 
sharpens considerably, as it is sharpening today, when-
ever protest erupts . 
A History of Illusion 
In the service of the status quo, history is best obliter-
ated while illusion is made resilient and recyclable. Tak-
ing advantage of this modern axiom, Vice President 
Bush pointedly recalled in an April speech that just after 
World War II a generous American proposal for stop-
ping the arms race before it started was met with "a 
loud 'nyet. "' 
It is true that many Americans at that time were anx-
ious to bring the atom under cooperative international 
control. Even before the 1945 attack on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, some of the scientists who created the Bomb 
tried to prevent the dizzying nuclear arms race they cor-
rectly predicted it would set off. 
In June of that year, a group of them submitted a 
memorandum known as the Franck Report to Secretary 
of War Stimson, asking that the first public demonstra-
tion of an atomic explosion take place on a remote 
deserted site rather than over a Japanese city. The 
report also suggested that the US then renounce the use 
of this weapon if other nations would do the same. 
These suggestions were not given serious consideration. 
After the Hiroshima and Nagasaki devastation, more 
scientists, a significant percentage of the public, and 
even some politicians concluded that the secret of the 
atom must be shared among all the nations of the world 
if disaster was to be avoided. Stimson himself, who had 
supported the bombings, proposed an "atomic partner-
ship'' with the Russians. 
But other policymakers had quite different ideas. 
General Leslie Groves, the military overseer of the war-
time bomb project, was typical of those who pushed for 
a hefty military share in the control of the atom. This 
was the same crew that strongly opposed international 
cooperation in nuclear development. A debate between 
them and proponents of civilian and international con-
trol raged for months in Congress. 
One of the lobbying methods of the Groves group was 
to whip up public hysteria with scare stories about the 
need to protect the "secret of the atom" from Russian 
"atom spies." In reality, "technical secrets" were of 
secondary importance. The basic principles of atomic 
explosions were known to scientists from many coun-
tries, and American scientists testified that the Russians 
would have the Bomb within a few years. (What was 
kept secret was an ambitious and inevitably futile effort 
directed by Groves to corner the world's supplies of 
uranium and thorium.) 
In 1946, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act, 
making it illegal for American scientists to continue to 
share nuclear information even with England or Canada 
-whose scientists and engineers had made large contri-
butions to the wartime effort that produced the Bomb, 
and who, after all, were America's closest allies. The act 
also gave the military much of the control over nuclear 
development that it wanted. 
Still, there continued to be so much high-level senti-
ment for international control of the atom that the US 
submitted to the United Nations what now seems a dras-
tically liberal proposal. The first version of what later 
became known as the Baruch Plan declared that the 
United States was willing to submit to a world authority 
. for the Atomic Era. 
The Soviet Union was not impressed. Some historians 
attribute its wariness solely to Stalin's paranoia. The 
fact is that the ''world authority'' would have been con-
stituted through the United Nations, which at that time 
was effectively controlled by the Americans. Soviet sus-
picions grew-with growing reason-as the plan went 
through several revisions, each considerably less mag-
nanimous than the last. 
One of the early but already fatally flawed versions of 
the plan was drawn up by a group of scientists, military 
men and executives from corporations which had played 
key roles in the Bomb's development. The major draw-
back of this plan was a requirement that the Soviet 
Union immediately hand over control of its uranium 
deposits to the "international authority." The US was 
asked only to promise to share its nuclear secrets and 
stop producing bombs at some unspecified future date, 
whenever the international body could agree on a per-
manent treaty. 
The plan was further butchered when President Tru-
man chose financier Bernard Baruch to translate it into 
"more workable" terms. Baruch 's yet-more-hawkish 
group insisted on a provision for " swift and sure 
punishment" of any nation that violated the ban on 
nuclear development. This threat was clearly aimed at 
the Soviets, who had already begun a frantic scramble 
for a nuke of their own. 
In the words of journalist I.F. Stone, by this time the 
proposal ''must have seemed to Moscow the blueprint 
for a world capitalist super-state in which the US would 
retain its atomic monopoly behind the facade of an 
international organization under US control." Dean 
Acheson, then undersecretary of state and one of the 
authors of the plan, admitted years later that the Baruch 
revisions ''meant certain defeat of the treaty by Soviet 
veto.'' 
The Soviet counter-proposal, offered by its UN dele-
gate, Andrei Gromyko, called for the destruction of all 
nuclear weapons in existence and the cessation of their 
production. The American response came four days 
before the formal rejection. On July 1, 1946, the US set 
off its first postwar test explosion over Bikini Atoll. 
Alva Myrdal, a Swedish diplomat who spent twelve 
years as an arms controller and then wrote a book called 
The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and 
Russia Run the Arms Race, writes of this period, "The 
pattern ... had been set: both sides would present pro-
posals for disarmament agreements, of often wholesale 
dimensions, but would be careful to see to it that those 
would contain conditions which the opposite side could 
not accept." 
The A-Bomb's Big Brother 
The next serious sidling up to arms control came in 
1955, after the arms race had gained considerable 
momentum. The Soviets had exploded their first atomic 
bomb in 1949. The US detonated the first hydrogen 
bomb, massively larger than the fission type, in 1952; 
the USSR matched this feat a year later. 
Arms negotiations had been stuck for years on the 
issue of inspection of military sites: the US accused the 
Soviets of wanting disarmament without inspection, 
while the Soviets felt that US proposals called for 
inspection without disarmament. 
Then, on May 10, in the middle of arms control talks 
being held in London, the Soviet Union suddenly an-
nounced it would agree to the West's plan for inter-
national inspection of nuclear sites and to its figures for 
ceilings on conventional armies. These proposed limits 
on armed forces were attractive to the Soviets because 
of their fear that West Germany, which had joined 
NATO on May 5, was about to rebuild a large army. 
The Soviets virtually plagiarized their new position from 
/J)EUEVJ! ,r OR. Nor I 
. ON llH: EVE OF T'Hf. 
WORU>:S FIRST ATOMIC f><PLOSION 
. IN ALAM0(iORl>O, N£W MEXICO, NUCLEAR 
5C:rl!N11ST' IN~CO ,~, nx>k am WITH 
HIS MAHHAffAN PllO.JllC:1' C::~1'S ON 
WHe1J.i&R TH, 1'lSr WOULI) l~N11"£. 11-ilt AIR, 
ANP IP ,;o;, WME™elt 'TM! GU~ WOULD 11tS~Y 
l(EW M~XICO OR THe. WHOU WORJ.1)/! 
British and French proposals, which in turn closely 
reflected the American negotiating position. 
European diplomats were jubilant at the break-
through. "It's almost too good to be true," the French 
delegate enthused. The American and British delegates 
both issued statements confirming that the Soviet pro-
posals were in large measure the same as theirs. 
In Washington, however, the response was strangely 
restrained. Perhaps because its arms control offers had 
not been meant to be taken seriously, the US made a 
startling turnaround of its own. President Eisenhower 
began making speeches questioning the wisdom of let-
ting Soviets inspect US military sites. After a recess, the 
US delegate returned to the London negotiations to an-
nounce the withdrawal of every previous American pro-
posal-including the ones that were so close to what the 
Soviets now said they'd go along with. 
The Soviets had agreed to every substantial American 
condition, and the response from the US was that it 
hadn't really meant it that way. It was this "no," not a 
"nyet," which scuttled the closest approach to a real 
arms control agreement ever. 
Shortly afterward, a new factor entered the arms con-
trol equation. Popular protest against nuclear weapons, 
which had been extremely muted during the decade fol-
lowing the war, made an appearance. 
Fear of Fallout 
The catalyzing event for the protest was a 1954 Amer-
ican nuclear test on the Bikini Atoll. Fallout from the 
multimegaton explosion, blown by the wind in an un-
anticipated direction, rained onto hundreds of Marshall 
Islanders and a Japanese fishing boat called the Lucky 
Dragon. The Marshallese were quickly moved to 
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another island by the US Navy, but many fell ill. (They 
and their children continue to feel the effects of their 
exposure to this day.) All the Japanese fishermen got 
radiation sickness, and one died of it six months later. 
The fate of the Lucky Dragon touched off an investi-
gation of the health effects of radioactive fallout. Many 
prominent scientists, including Albert Einstein and 
Linus Pauling, supported the disturbing findings, which 
launched nearly a decade of protest against atmospheric 
testing. 
Unfortunately, the danger from the use of nuclear 
bombs on real targets was either too little understood or 
too overwhelming to be targeted by the antitesting cam-
paign. It was the cancer predictions and the stron-
tium-90 in the baby's milk that evoked a frenzy of fear 
and widespread dissent. 
The peace movement picked up the ball and ran. It 
looked like a winning strategy: concentrate on the fall-
out, downplay the possibility of nuclear holocaust, and 
ignore the politics of the arms race. 
By the late fifties, a campaign to push for a compre-
hensive test ban treaty was well under way. It won the 
backing of significant majorities in the United States, 
Western and Eastern Europe, Japan, and many other 
countries. In Britain, ban-the-bomb sentiment grew into 
a movement, with sit-ins, rallies, and huge demonstra-
tions like the Aldermaston Easter March in 1960. 
A group of "nonaligned" countries, responding to 
anti-Bomb sentiment in their own backyards, worked 
out a detailed plan for a comprehensive test ban treaty. 
Most nonnuclear countries declared themselves willing 
to sign a multilateral ban, despite the fact that it would 
hamper their efforts to develop nuclear weapons and 
would thereby institutionalize the superpowers' 
monopoly. 
The protests and negotiations lasted for several years. 
These were years during which the arms race passed sev-
eral important mileposts of escalation, with unfortu-
nately little reaction from the testing-preoccupied pro-
test movement. The superpowers first stopped the 
atmospheric tests, then, led by the Soviets, started them 
again. The Soviets launched the Sputnik and shot down 
an American U-2 plane secretly spying over its territory; 
Eisenhower warned of the military-industrial complex; 
Kennedy invented a fictional "missile gap" and faced 
down Khrushchev in the Cuban missile crisis. 
The Arms Race Goes Underground 
Finally, in 1963, the Soviets again backed down on a 
long-held negotiating position. This time they gave up 
their insistence that an agreement cover all kinds of test-
ing. Abandoning the ongoing multilateral efforts to 
achieve a comprehensive test ban, the US and the USSR 
began bilateral talks · in Moscow. Within weeks, they 
had concocted a partial test ban treaty. 
The partial ban merely moved the tests underground. 
It was by no means a barrier to further nuclear develop-
ment on either side: the US was already setting off more 
test explosions underground or underwater than in the 
atmosphere. 
Not only did the partial treaty fail to contain the arms 
race, it wound up clearing the way for its escalation. 
Despite the fact that Khrushchev had given in to Ken-
nedy's terms, right-wing politicians in the US accused 
the president of being soft on the Commies . The sup-
port of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was finally won by the 
administration's argument that forcing the tests under-
ground, where they are more difficult and expensive, 
would hamper the Soviet nuclear advance far more than 
the American one. But the real selling point for the 
hawks was Kennedy's pledge of lots of new, more 
sophisticated weapons. 
As limited as the treaty was, and as sweetened with 
promises of arms escalation, it met with resistance in the 
Senate. George McGovern finally exclaimed in exasper-
ation that ''the Administration has been called upon to 
give so many assurances of our continued nuclear ef-
forts . . . that a casual observer might assume that we are 
approving this treaty so that we can accelerate the arms 
race and beef up the war-making facilities of our 
country!" 
To most people, this judgment was not so clear at the 
time. Alva Myrdal, who had been instrumental in the 
multilateral push for a comprehensive ban, remembers, 
"I only gradually experienced this fateful turn of events 
as a rude awakening. So hopeful were we that we 
euphorically hailed this agreement as of utmost impor-
tance. We took it for granted, as we were told, that it 
was the first step towards the discontinuance of all test-
ing of nuclear weapons." Later, Myrdal wrote that the 
partial ban "can hardly be considered among disarma-
ment measures," though "it should be given some cred-
it as a public health measure.'' 
The partial test ban was greeted by the peace move-
ment as its greatest victory. The campaign that had fed 
on the fear of fallout swallowed the treaty hook, line, 
and sinker. Then, unprepared to deal with any but the 
narrowest of nuclear concerns, it practically vanished. 
In the following years , underground testing proved 
adequate for the development of all kinds of new wea-
pons. The most destabilizing of these were MIRVs, mul-
tiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, which 
allow a single missile to deliver numerous nuclear war-
heads to different targets. Because the number of war-
heads per missile can no longer be easily verified and be-
cause their precision makes possible a first strike against 
the other side's strategic missiles, MIRVs helped make 
arms control more unlikely than ever. 
"Why SALT Spells Fraud" 
Starting in 1967 and through the seventies, arms con-
trol centered on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks 
(SALT). Two superpower agreements, together known 
as SALT I, were reached in 1972: one limiting the 
deployment of antiballistic missiles and another limiting 
the increase in strategic arms (nuclear-tipped missiles 
with intercontinental range). SALT II, signed in 1974 
but never ratified by the US Senate, established a ceiling 
on the number of MIRVs each side was allowed. 
None of the SALT agreements meant elimination or 
even reductions of weapons. On the contrary, in the 
words of Myrdal, "there is only a haggling over margin-
al differences in their continued increase." In fact, the 
ceilings to which the superpowers agreed were amazing-
ly close to the numbers they had planned to deploy any-
way. No limitations at all were placed on tactical (short-
range) or conventional weapons or on qualitative 
improvements of strategic missiles or warheads. Work 
on the cruise missi le, one of the most destabilizing new 
weapons of the last decade, was begun after the SALT I 
agreement was signed. According to Fred Kaplan (Bos-
ton Globe, July 19, 1982), the cruise program was fund-
ed by the Nixon administration "as a bargaining chip to 
strengthen the US hand in SALT II negotiations." (The 
cruise is a small, jet-powered missile that is supposed to 
be able to evade radar detection by flying close to the 
ground with the aid of a terrain-following computer 
guidance system.) 
One difference between SALT and earlier arms con-
trol agreements is the extent to which commentators 
immediately saw it as a charade. In 1969, three years 
before the first treaty was signed, I.F. Stone wrote an 
article called "Why SALT Spells Fraud." 
Myrdal commented, "By no stretch of the imagina-
tion can SALT II be called arms limitation. Instead it is 
a mutually agreed continuation of the arms race, regu-
lated and institutionalized." 
Keep On Talking 
Although arms control is little more than what Stone 
calls a "theater of delusion," we can expect endless cur-
tain calls. Talk about arms control will keep pace with 
new rounds in the arms race. 
The arms control ritual allows each superpower to 
hail its valiant efforts for peace, efforts (each one 
laments) that have been tragically foiled by the other 
side. The basic decency of each government is affirmed 
and support for its ever-escalating arms buildup-and 
its other policies-is assured. 
Thus legitimized, the superpowers are free to contin-
ue using the permanent nuclear showdown as they 
always have. Like the Cold War it complements, "arms 
control" is a device by which the superpowers control 
the governments of other countries, their allies, and 
their own populations. 
Marcy Darnovsky is a member of the Abalone Alliance, a 
California-based anti-nuclear group organizing against both 
weapons and nuclear power. The original version of this article 
appeared in their newsletter, It's A bout Times. This version is 
reprinted from Radical America, Vol. 6, No. 4-5. 
Guatemala 
Army of the Poor (EGP) and Revolutionary Organiza-
tion of the People in Arms (ORPA)-are also active in 
Indian areas of Guatemala. The EGP, which was organ-
ized in 1975, has been particularly active in the depart-
ments of Huehuetenango, El Quiche, and Alta Verapaz, 
as well as along the south coast around Escuintla. In the 
northern highlands, the EGP has ambushed a number 
of army patrols, and perfected a tactic of "armed prop-
aganda." Guerrilla units will launch lightning raids of 
towns and plantations, and then hold propaganda meet-
ings in the native languages. Over the past two years, the 
EGP is reported to have established a firm base among 
the local indigenous population . The EGP Ernesto Gue-
vara guerrilla front, which was established in Huehue-
tenango in 1979, is said to be made up almost entirely of 
Indians. 
ORPA has had similar successes among Indian peo-
ples in the center and western parts of the country. In 
September 1980, ORPA occupied several Indian towns 
around Lake Atitlan in the Department of Solola, con-
ducting propaganda meetings among local residents, 
and forcing many tourists to leave the area. In response, 
the Guatemalan government set up an army base in San-
tiago Atitlan and then began to terrorize the local Indi-
an population . Gaspar Culan-the director of the Indi-
an language radio station, La Vaz de Atitlan-and 
several other Indians were murdered by the army in one 
of its anti-guerrilla raids. When the people protested 
- - -
about this incident and other acts of repression by the 
army to the mayor of Solola, they were told that they 
could expect no help from the government as long as 
ORPA continues to function in the area. 
During 1981, the civil war in Guatemala became so in-
tense that the government began to kidnap and murder 
anyone who was involved in rural development work. In 
February 1981, the army entered the village of Las 
Lomas in San Martin Jilotepeque in Chimaltenango, 
burned all of the houses to the ground, and killed more 
than 85 Indian men, women and children. Death lists in 
Chimaltenango, at this time, included members of the 
National Reconstruction Committee, leaders of com-
munity unions, and artists' groups, Christian Demo-
cratic mayors, school teachers and lawyers, and even 
members of the local Alcoholics Anonymous. 
There is a common saying in Guatemala that when 
the Indians begin to rise up, the volcanos that dot the 
mountain landscape will begin to erupt. Today, the In-
dians of Guatemala are only beginning to flex their 
muscles. Someday soon, however, the full force of the 
volcano will erupt. When that happens, a new Guate-
mala will be born . D 
Shelton H. Davis, an anthropologist and member of the 
Guatemala Scholar's Network , is the founder of the Anthro-
pology Resource Center (ARC), a past recipient of Resist 
funds. This article originally appeared in Akwesasne Notes in 
the summer of 1981, before the Rios Monte government took 
over in Guatemala . The article is reprinted here from Native 
Peoples in Struggle, a new book co-published by ARC and the 
Emergency Response International Network. The book is 
available from the latter for $12.99. Wtite E.R.I.N. Publica-
tions, PO Box 41, Bombay, NY 12914. 
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DRAFT INFORMATION ALLIANCE (539 8th Ave., 
Menlo Park, CA 94025). 
The Draft Information Alliance (DIA) is a network of 
"Third World" draft counselors and minority-based 
draft counseling and education projects throughout 
California. Their goal is to provide training, education, 
resource-sharing and networking services in order to 
strengthen existing draft and counter-recruitment pro-
grams in Chicano, Indian, Black and Asian communi-
ties. The services that DIA provides are of crucial 
importance for several reasons. First, minority com-
munities have always been disproportionately affected by 
the US military. 26% of the casualties of the Vietnam 
war were Blacks and 16-20% were Latinos. The general 
population consisted of only 12% Blacks and 5% 
Latinos at the time. Second, the "poverty draft," which 
forces minority and other low income youth to enlist in 
the military as their options for employment, job train-
ing and education disappear, has resulted in over 50% 
minority representation in the "volunteer" army. Final-
ly, issues relating to the draft and military service touch 
upon cultural values and family relationships as well as 
social and economic conditions. For all these reasons 
there is a critical need to train minority draft counselors 
who can provide the culturally sensitive draft and coun-
ter-recruitment counseling that has been lacking in most 
draft counseling projects. DIA is made up entirely of 
Chicano, Black and Indian draft counselors with a high 
degree of participation by Chicano and Black Vietnam 
Vets. Resist's grant will be used for general support. 
SYRACUSE PEACE COUNCIL (124 Burnet, Syra-
cuse, NY 13203). 
The Syracuse Peace Council has been an active group in 
upstate New York since 1936. Syracuse is only 50 miles 
from the Seneca Army Depot, one of two storage sites 
in the US for nuclear weapons being shipped to Europe, 
most notably the neutron bomb and the Pershing II. 
Additionally, upstate NY is the site of many military 
bases, nuclear waste storage sites and toxic chemical 
dumps. SPC works hard to include a philosophy of non-
violence, feminism and anti-militarism in their work. 
Their vision of the world is a place "where war, violence 
and exploitation of all kinds (economic, racial, sexual, 
age, etc.) do not exist.'' An important part of their work 
is monthly publication of the Peace Newsletter. They 
use the publication as a forum for both local and na-
tional issues such as: the massacre in Lebanon, local 
draft resistance updates, civilian based defense, the 
Freeze, local congressional candidates and Arab-Black 
community relations in Syracuse. Some task forces and 
projects of SPC include Upstate Feminist Peace 
Alliance, Citizens United Against Police Brutality, 
Cruise Missile Project and Seneca Army Depot, Nuclear 
Weapons Freeze Campaign, Upstate Resistance, East 
Timar Human Rights Committee, Friends of Central 
America United in Support, Anarchist Study Group and 
Animal Rights. Resist's grant will help suport two Euro-
pean peace activists who are interning at SPC this year. 
EL CENTRO CAMPESINO FARMWORKER CEN-
TER (Bos 3021, Winter Haven, .FL). 
El Centro is an organization of Mexican, Haitian, Sal-
vadoran, and American farmworkers. It is based in 
Polk County, the heart of Florida's citrus industry, 
where 25,000 orange pickers live and work. In Polk 
County there are twice as many workers as there are 
jobs, and there is no central place for workers to go to 
find out what work is available. Many of the crew lead-
ers for the migrant industry are unscrupulous: they 
often cheat, beat and intimidate the workers. Housing 
that landlords will rent to farmworkers (non-white) with 
children is in very short supply and bad condition. Doc-
tors and hospitals turn sick people away and the social 
welface agencies provide more jobs to middle class 
whites than services to farmworkers. The prejudice of 
native rural whites is aggravated by language barriers 
for both Hispanics and Haitians, most of whom speak 
°little English. About three-fourths of all the Hispanic 
farmworkers in the county are un-documented (8,000). 
They are subject to unjust treatment, by both police and 
migrant officers, in direct violation of immigration laws 
and regulations. With education, workers are able to 
counter such violations and avoid deportation . El Cen-
tro has recently established a Rights Committee which is 
comprised of 12 organizers who work on civil rights 
issues including: immigration, police abuse, crew leader 
abuse and support of union organizing. Resist's grant 
will support this project. 
ADDITIONAL GRANTS 
MUJERES LATINAS (500 Talbot Ave., Dorchester, 
MA 02124) 
COMMUNITY WORKS (c/ o The Paulist Center, 5 
Park St., Boston, MA 02111) 
SUBSTITUTES UNITED FOR BETTER SCHOOLS 
(SUBS, 50 E. Van Buren , Rm 810, Chicago, IL 
60605) 
CLERGY AND LAITY CONCERNED (PO Box 
90557, Nashville TN 37209) 
8TH INTERNATIONAL INDIAN TREATY COUN-
CIL CONFERENCE (1145 E. 6th St., Tucson, AZ 
85719) 
COMMITTEE TO ABOLISH PRISON SLAVERY 
(PO Box 3207, Washington, DC 20010) 
COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE MEXICANO 
POLITICAL PRISONERS (PO Box 1073, Alamosa, 
co 81101) 
